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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Olson v. One 1999 Lexus,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court faced 
the challenge of determining whether a Minnesota vehicle forfeiture statute2 
violated due process in light of an eighteen-month delay between the seizure 
of a vehicle and the post-seizure hearing.3 Megan Olson, a repeat driving-
while-impaired (DWI) offender and the daughter of Helen Olson, was 
driving her mother’s car when she was arrested for a fourth DWI offense.4 
This resulted in the seizure of the vehicle, despite the fact that the driver 
was not the owner.  
Minnesota’s forfeiture statute required that Megan’s pending criminal 
proceeding be resolved before the forfeiture action could begin,5 which 
contributed to the eighteen-month delay. The court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute on its face and as applied to Megan, the non-
owner driver.6 However, the majority ruled that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to Helen, the alleged innocent owner of the 
vehicle.7 The court reached its decision by applying the analytical test from 
Mathews v. Eldridge,8 which concerned process before the termination of 
Social Security disability benefits, rather than Barker v. Wingo,9 which 
involved the constitutionality of a delay prior to a criminal trial. 
                                                           
*Kathryn Simunic is a J.D. Candidate, expected to graduate in 2021 from the Mitchell 
Hamline School of Law. Kathryn would like to thank Professor Marie Failinger for providing 
guidance on this case note.  She would also like to express her gratitude to her husband, 
Roko, for his unconditional support. 
1
 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019). 
2
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d) (2018). 
3
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602. 
4
 Id. at 598. 
5
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d). 
6




 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
9
 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
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This case note begins with a discussion of the judiciary’s controversial 
efforts to navigate the complexities of the variable and unpredictable 
procedural due process doctrine.10 A brief overview of procedural due 
process in the context of civil forfeiture follows, with an explanation of the 
commonalities between civil forfeiture and criminal law.11 The use of the 
Mathews framework and Barker factors in procedural due process, 
specifically in Minnesota, are also discussed.12 Next, the facts and procedural 
history of Olson follow,13 along with an explanation of the majority’s 
decision.14  
This note then continues with an analysis of the constitutional test 
employed in Olson,15 arguing that the use of the Barker factors would have 
been more appropriate because of the quasi-criminal nature of civil 
forfeiture along with the United States Supreme Court’s application of 
Barker for this specific forfeiture issue.16 The note goes on to examine the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in applying the Mathews 
framework—because of the court’s desire to follow Minnesota precedent—
and disregarding the differences between private property and 
administrative benefits.17 Subsequently, the note argues that Olson, if 
decided under the Barker factors, would likely have held the forfeiture 
statute constitutional as applied to both Megan and Helen.18 This result is 
then compared with the outcome for innocent owners generally, arguing 
that Barker provides a stronger claim for these individuals.19 Finally, this case 
note concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Olson ruling on 
future cases in Minnesota.20  
                                                           
10
 See infra Section II.A. 
11
 See infra Section II.B. 
12
 See infra Section II.C. 
13
 See infra Section III.A. 
14
 See infra Section III.B. 
15
 See infra Part IV. 
16
 See infra Section IV.A. 
17
 See infra Section IV.B. 
18
 See infra Section IV.C. 
19
 See id. 
20
 See infra Section IV.D. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. Origin and Evolution of Procedural Due Process 
 The roots of due process trace back to the Magna Carta of 1215.21 
Originating from English law, due process aimed to protect individuals from 
the unrestrained power of the King.22 The notorious Clause 39 stated, “No 
free man shall be . . . stripped of his rights or possessions . . . except by the 
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”23 Almost 600 years 
later, the Framers sought to replicate these rights by carefully constructing 
this language in a more simplistic form.24 The due process protections are 
embedded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution to ensure fair procedures are in place to prevent the arbitrary 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government.25 The underlying 
premise of the procedural due process doctrine is “‘the opportunity to be 
heard’ . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”26  
Since their inception within the Bill of Rights, these seemingly 
simplified clauses have proven to be increasingly complex in the eyes of the 
21
 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378–79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
original concept of due process found in the Magna Carta); see also Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (noting that “due process of law” 
and “law of the land” are synonymous); W. J. Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in 
American Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL L. REV. 561 (1954). 
22
 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (“[Due process of law] come[s] to us from 
the law of England, from which country our jurisprudence is to a great extent derived; and 
their requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the 
crown, and place him under the protection of the law.”); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The 
Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 327–50 (2016) (discussing the events 
leading up to the creation of the Magna Carta, its impact on English Law, and its influence 
on developing American constitutional law). 
23
 English Translation of Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBRARY (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation [https://
perma.cc/6XB8-Z9FF]. 
24 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–33 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing 
the influence of Clause 39 on the Framers in enacting the Due Process Clause); see also 
Leonard W. Klingen, Our Due Process Debt to Magna Carta, 90 FLA. B.J., 16, 18 (2016) 
(“It is a testament to their genius that the framers’ more economical use of language did 
nothing to narrow the reach of the protections thus afforded.”). 
25
 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
26
 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 
394 (1914)). 
4
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courts.27 Aside from acknowledging that due process is an individual right, 
the clauses are rather vague and lack detail as to what guarantees are 
specifically afforded.28 In the absence of explicit guidance, courts have relied 
on the concept of fundamental fairness to resolve the ambiguities and 
further develop the doctrine.29 Given its ambiguous nature, due process 
demands a fact-specific analysis for each individual case.30  
Typically, courts begin a due process analysis by assessing whether the 
liberty or property interest at issue falls within the protections of due 
process.31 Prior to the 1970s, government benefits were not considered 
protected interests under this analysis.32 However, with the expansion of 
27
 See Larkin, supra note 22, at 296 (suggesting that the ambiguous language of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments has led to continual interpretations by the judiciary, specifically in 
unraveling the meaning of the terms “depriving,” “person,” “liberty,” and “property”). 
28 See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (“‘Due process’ is an elusive concept. Its 
exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual 
contexts.”); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) (“[I]t may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to give to the terms ‘due process of law’ a definition which will embrace every 
permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as are forbidden.”). 
29 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981) (“Applying the Due 
Process Clause is . . . an uncertain enterprise which must discover what 
‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant 
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”); Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly 
between the individual and government, ‘due process’ is compounded of history, reason, 
the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith 
which we profess.”); Kelley v. Alamo, 964 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1992); McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 892 (11th Cir. 1985); Barlau v. Northfield, 568 F. Supp. 181, 188 (D. 
Minn. 1983). 
30
 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Cafeteria 
Workers & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“[D]ue 
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances.”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the ever-changing nature of due 
process and its ability to adapt to the demands of society). 
31 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669, 1717–19 (1975) (explaining the privileges that typically did not receive due 
process protections as well as providing examples of interests that are now recognized under 
due process expansion); Sara B. Tosdal, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1003, 1010–12 (2011) (comparing the approaches taken by the United States Supreme 
Court in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy and Board of 
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth to demonstrate the analysis of the Court). 
32
 See Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot 
on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 863, 867 (1994) (noting that 
benefit payments and employment from the government were not protected under due 
5
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administrative agencies following the New Deal, due process concerns 
regarding the fairness of administrative proceedings were on the rise.33 The 
growing prevalence of these cases gave way to the landmark decision in 
Goldberg v. Kelly,34 where the United States Supreme Court enforced due 
process rights in the context of administrative proceedings.35  
In Goldberg, procedural due process protections were expanded to 
include a new form of property interest: welfare benefits.36 The petitioners 
in Goldberg received financial aid through federal and New York State 
assistance programs.37 The aid, however, was terminated without prior 
notice or an evidentiary hearing.38 After the suit had commenced, New York 
developed procedures for providing notice and a hearing.39 The Court, 
accordingly, considered two issues: (1) whether notice and a hearing are 
required prior to the termination of welfare benefits and (2) whether the 
State’s revised procedures satisfied due process.40  
First, the Court weighed the individual’s need for welfare assistance 
against the government’s concern of protecting public funds.41 The Court 
reasoned that the stakes were much higher for an eligible individual, who 
would likely be impoverished without the federal aid.42 This vital individual 
need substantially outweighed the government’s interest.43 Moreover, Justice 
Brennan stated that “[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements 
as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”44 Thus, terminating these statutory 
process in the era prior to Goldberg v. Kelly); see also Stewart, supra note 31, at 1717–19 
(explaining the privileges that typically did not receive due process protections and providing 
examples of interests that are now recognized under due process expansion). 
33
 See Tosdal, supra note 31, at 1007 (discussing the history of administrative law and the 
agencies born from the New Deal, specifically the Social Security Administration and the 
National Labor Relations Board). 
34
 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
35
 Id. at 263–64. 
36
 See id. at 261–62; see also Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1063 (1984), (noting that the decision in Goldberg resulted in the 
expansion of procedural due process to a wide array of government benefits that had not 
previously been recognized as protected property).  
37




 Id. at 257. 
40
 Id. at 256–57. 
41




 Id.  
44
 Id. at 262 n.8; see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) 
(discussing the rights-privileges distinction and branding government benefits as “new 
property” because of their comparable economic importance to personal property). 
6
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entitlements—a now-protected interest—without an evidentiary hearing 
would deprive individuals of their property without due process.45 
Second, the majority assessed New York’s new procedures to 
determine what process is due in terminating welfare benefits.46 It 
recognized that due process “require[d] that a recipient have timely and 
adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an 
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by 
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.”47 The Court quickly 
glossed over the seven-day notice outlined by the State’s procedures but 
acknowledged that the recipient’s inability to present evidence orally or 
question an adverse witness resulted in insufficient due process.48 
As the doctrine evolved, courts continued to develop various 
frameworks and analytical tools to assess due process violations. Goldberg 
had weighed private interests against governmental interests.49 This 
balancing test laid the foundation for the framework established in Mathews 
v. Eldridge.50 In Mathews, the petitioner’s Social Security disability benefits 
had been terminated without a prior evidentiary hearing.51 Given that the 
facts of Mathews had a striking resemblance to Goldberg, the Court applied 
the Goldberg test but identified a third prong.52 To determine whether due 
process required an evidentiary hearing before terminating disability 
payments, the Court balanced three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.53 
45
 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. 
46
 Id.  
47
 Id. at 267–68. 
48
 Id. at 268. 
49
 Id. at 261. This analysis created the basis of the Mathews test. See Lee, supra note 32, at 
884–87 (discussing the motivations behind Justice Brennan’s omission of the probability of 
erroneous deprivation prong that the district court had originally included in its analysis). 
50
 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
51
 Id. at 320. 
52
 Id. at 335; see also Lee, supra note 32, at 977–78 (noting that the Court reverted to the 
original test from the district court in Goldberg, which was not criticized in Justice Brennan’s 
dissenting opinion). 
53
 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263–71). Although Goldberg did 
not explicitly include the second factor from Mathews, the Goldberg Court expressed similar 
concerns about the risk of erroneous deprivation. Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266 
(“[T]he stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest 
7
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The Court distinguished the hardship faced in the deprivation of 
welfare benefits from that caused by the loss of disability benefits to reach 
its conclusion that a pre-termination hearing was not required in this case.54 
Since this decision, the Mathews framework has been extended to a wide 
array of cases involving various procedural due process violations.55  
 Prior to its decision in Mathews, the Court had also developed a set 
of factors in Barker v. Wingo56 to evaluate whether a delay of more than five 
years violated the defendant’s due process right to a speedy trial.57 The 
Barker test considers: “[1.] [l]ength of the delay, [2.] the reason for the delay, 
[3.] the defendant’s assertion of his right, and [4.] prejudice to the 
defendant.”58  
 In addition to Sixth Amendment due process challenges, the Barker 
test has been applied in the civil forfeiture context.59 In particular, courts 
have used these factors to assess the timing of forfeiture proceedings after 
property is seized.60 Even though Barker has been extended to civil 
forfeiture,61 courts remain divided over the proper test for analyzing 
error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the 
recipient a chance, . . . , to be fully informed of the case against him . . . .”),  with Mathews, 
424 U.S. at 335. 
54
 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340–41. 
55 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (invalidating the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 for inadequate process for the detention of enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (finding that the 
government’s process for placement in supermax prison provided acceptable due process); 
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 24 (1991) (holding that the statute providing prejudgment 
attachment without notice or a hearing constituted a procedural due process violation). See 
generally Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2010) (discussing that the Mathews test has 
been widely used by the Supreme Court for numerous areas of due process). 
56
 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
57
 Id. at 514. 
58
 Id. at 530. 
59 Teresia B. Jovanovic, Annotation, Delay Between Seizure of Personal Property by Federal 
Government and Institution of Proceedings for Forfeiture Thereof as Violative of Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Requirements, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 373, § 2 (1984) (“As a general 
proposition, any delay between the seizure of personal property by federal governmental 
officials and the institution of proceedings for forfeiture thereof, which is substantial, 
unexcused, and unreasonable in view of the circumstances presented, will bar further 
forfeiture proceedings on due process grounds.”). 
60 See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 2382 (2019) (indicating that the Barker factors supply 
the appropriate test for evaluating procedural due process requirements specific to timeliness 
and delays in forfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. $23,407.69 in U.S. Currency, 
715 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Piteo, 726 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
61
 See, e.g., United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (applying Barker’s four-factor balancing test to determine 
8
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procedural due process in this context.62 Many courts continue to consider 
Mathews to be the more suitable framework because of its ability to 
encompass a broad scope of procedural due process issues.63 
B. Overview of Procedural Due Process in Civil Forfeiture  
 Like procedural due process, civil forfeiture has a long-standing 
history in English common law.64 Civil forfeiture often includes the 
deprivation of property from an owner who used it to facilitate a crime, or 
assisted others in committing a crime intentionally or negligently.65 Deep-
rooted precedent established that the property is guilty of the crime rather 
that there was no unreasonable delay in filing a forfeiture action); United States v. One 1976 
Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F.2d 1171 (1982); United States v. One 1978 Cadillac Sedan De 
Ville, 490 F. Supp. 725 (1980); United States v. One 1973 Ford LTD, Serial. No. 
3J66S132017, 409 F. Supp. 741 (1976). 
62
 See Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 60 (2d Cir. 2002) (employing Mathews to evaluate 
the requirement for a prompt post-seizure hearing of a vehicle). But see United States v. Two 
Hundred Ninety-Five Ivory Carvings, 726 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to uphold 
the district court’s decision that due process was violated by the government’s nineteen-
month delay in initiating civil forfeiture proceedings because the Barker factors had not been 
evaluated).  
63
 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993); Parham 
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979); Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles,
648 F.3d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 2011); Chernin v. Welchans, 844 F.2d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 1988); 
McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1985); Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN 
License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X007961, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019). 
64
 See Michele M. Jochner, From Fiction to Fact: The Supreme Court’s Re-evaluation of 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, 82 ILL. B.J. 560, 561 (1994) (noting that legal historians have 
found origins of civil forfeiture in the Bible); see also Jacob M. Hilton, Keep Him on a Short 
Leash: Innocence of Owner Not a Constitutional Defense to Forfeiture of Property Allegedly 
Connected to Illegal Conduct: Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 28 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 133, 135–36 (1997) (explaining the three types of forfeiture under English common 
law: deodand, forfeiture upon conviction of felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture, and 
that the United States only adopted statutory forfeiture, which had primarily been used in 
connection with customs and revenue laws violations). 
65 See Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining civil forfeiture as “[a]n 
in rem proceeding brought by the government against property that either facilitated a crime 
or was acquired as a result of criminal activity”); see also Mary M. Cheh, Can Something 
This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the 
Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (explaining the modern characteristics of 
civil forfeitures). 
9
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than the property owner.66 This has commonly become known as the 
“guilty-property fiction.”67  
As opposed to criminal proceedings against an individual, civil 
forfeiture acts in rem against the property itself.68 Pursuing these proceedings 
in rem means that they are usually civil as opposed to criminal.69 Such 
proceedings remain highly controversial because civil claimants are afforded 
fewer constitutional protections than criminal defendants, including the lack 
of a right to a jury trial and a lower standard of proof.70  
Additionally, certain circumstances allow in rem proceedings to 
commence without the typical minimum due process requirements of prior 
notice and a hearing. For example, the Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin,71 
recognized that various “‘extraordinary situations’ . . . justify postponing 
notice and opportunity for a hearing.”72 It indicated that each of these 
instances met a common set of conditions:  
First, . . . the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an 
important governmental  or general public interest. Second, 
there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, . . . 
the person initiating the seizure has been a government official 
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly 
drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular 
instance.73 
Thus, in some situations, the very link between forfeiture and criminal 
activity can serve as the basis for the government’s ability to seize property.  
 While civil forfeiture had long existed as a sanction in common law, 
its use was relatively rare until the 1970s with the passage of the Racketeer 
66 See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (“[T]he 
thing is primarily considered the offender.”); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 233 
(1844) (“The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty 
instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the 
character or conduct of the owner.”); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (1827) (“The thing is here 
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the 
thing.”).  
67
 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 616 (1993). 
68
 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 1 (2019). 
69
 Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017). 
70
 Id. at 847–48; David J. Stone, The Opportunity of Austin v. United States: Toward a 
Functional Approach to Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 427, 
434–35 (1993) (criticizing the fact that forfeiture proceedings are classified as civil as opposed 
to criminal because of the fewer of constitutional protections that are afforded to civil 
litigants). 
71
 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
72
 Id. at 90. 
73
 Id. at 91. 
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA).74 These acts were passed in an effort to curtail illegal 
activity arising from criminal enterprises, and they allowed property of 
criminal organizations to be forfeited.75 However, the increasing prevalence 
of civil forfeiture led to heightened scrutiny in order to manage the risk of 
abuse. In particular, with the close connection between civil forfeiture and 
criminal activity, courts have noted the danger of prejudice based on the 
timing of civil forfeiture proceedings prior to the conclusion of a related 
criminal matter.76 In those instances, the defense of a civil forfeiture 
proceeding may place the subsequent criminal proceedings in jeopardy.77 
Thus, courts have held that postponing forfeiture proceedings until the 
resolution of related criminal proceedings is warranted in certain 
circumstances.78  
 Despite its intended remedial purpose,79 civil forfeiture has been 
regarded as a quasi-criminal punishment due to its punitive impact and 
74




 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 
461 U.S. 555, 567 (1983) (citing United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1980)) 
(“In some circumstances, a civil forfeiture proceeding would prejudice the claimant’s ability 
to raise an inconsistent defense in a contemporaneous criminal proceeding.”); United States 
v. One 1976 Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1982) (“Had the government
pursued forfeiture at the same time, it is probable that [the defendant] would have claimed 
that his defense in the criminal case was being prejudiced.”). 
77 Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Pendency of Criminal Prosecution as Ground for 
Continuance or Postponement of Civil Action to Which Government is Party Involving 
Facts or Transactions Upon Which Prosecution is Predicted-Federal Cases, 33 A.L.R. FED. 
2d 111, § 2 (2009) (“Parties facing parallel civil and criminal proceedings are in an unenviable 
position, primarily since the scope of civil discovery is so much broader than that in the 
criminal realm. A party's defense of civil claims may thus threaten the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, particularly vis-a-vis testimony that would impact the criminal proceedings. 
Accordingly, courts have held that the pendency of parallel or related criminal proceedings 
may provide a basis for postponing the civil proceeding under certain conditions.”). 
78
 See, e.g., United States. v. Any and All Assets of Shane Co., 147 F.R.D. 99, 102 (M.D.N.C. 
1992) (granting a short stay of discovery in a civil forfeiture proceeding) (“Under the 
circumstances where the criminal investigation is pending and prior to indictment, and where 
claimants will not be able to fully provide discovery answers, the Court is less inclined to 
permit discovery or to allow partial discovery.”); United States v. One 1964 Cadillac Coupe 
DeVille, 41 F.R.D. 352, 354–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (explaining that the information in a 
claimant’s interrogatories in a civil forfeiture case was of “paramount importance” in the 
pending criminal action, which justified a stay of discovery until the criminal action was 
resolved). 
79
 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (quoting United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)) (“[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
11
Simunic: Constitutional Law: Courts Should Not Forfeit the Barker Factors
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
2020] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 741 
focus on deterrence.80 In 1974, this focus on a punitive and deterrent 
purpose guided the Court in reaching its decision in Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.81 There, the Court held that seizing a lessee’s 
yacht upon finding marijuana without providing prior notice or a hearing 
advanced the criminal statute’s purpose “by preventing further illicit use of 
the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering 
illegal behavior unprofitable.”82 The yacht’s lessor attempted to assert an 
innocent-owner defense to demonstrate that the lack of process prior to 
seizure violated his due process rights.83 The Court, however, found 
insufficient evidence that the lessor had done everything reasonably possible 
to prevent the unlawful behavior conducted on his property.84  
The dismissal of due process claims in forfeiture by innocent owners 
was not unprecedented85 as it had been supported by caselaw dating back as 
early as 1827.86 The justification for forfeiting the property of an innocent 
owner was, essentially, negligence—“that the owner may be held accountable 
for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his property.”87 The Court, 
however, has implied that it may be possible for a “truly” innocent owner, 
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or 
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.”). 
80 See United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Civil 
forfeiture statutes, although not sufficiently criminal to trigger the full array of constitutional 
protections, are nonetheless considered ‘quasi-criminal’ and implicate certain constitutional 
rights.”); 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 3 (2019) (“Forfeiture serves not only remedial purpose, but 
also retributive or punitive, and deterrent, purposes.”); see also Cheh, supra note 65, at 16–
17 (discussing the punitive impact of civil forfeiture, particularly for forfeiture of property 
used as a criminal instrument in which “punishment is imposed in addition to any criminal 
penalties and is wholly unrelated to whether criminal charges could be or were brought”). 
81
 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
82
 Id. at 686–87. 
83
 Id. at 680. 
84
 Id. at 690. 
85
 See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) (finding that 
a carriage that was used in the removal or concealment of goods removed with intent to 
defraud the United States must be forfeited); Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 
395 (1877) (subjecting the owner of a distillery property to forfeiture for the owner’s intent 
to defraud the United States of revenue); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) 
(holding that the vessel committing the aggression is the guilty instrument and implying that 
forfeiture attached to it despite the character or conduct of the owner). 
86
 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827) (holding that personal conviction of the offender is not 
necessary to enforce a forfeiture). 
87
 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993). 
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who did not have knowledge of the criminal activity and did not consent to 
it, to succeed in this defense.88  
C. Procedural Due Process in Minnesota  
The Minnesota Constitution contains a clause to prevent the 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process.89 Among these 
protections are reasonable notice and a timely opportunity to be heard.90 
However, the promptness of a hearing is not limited to a certain time 
frame.91 The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Mathews 
framework on numerous occasions when faced with a variety of procedural 
due process challenges.92 This is fitting because Mathews was designed to 
assess the general constitutionality of process. These cases involve process 
challenges for different types of proceedings, such as, child support,93 license 
revocations,94 and parole release.95  
88
 Calero, 416 U.S. at 689–90 (“It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to 
reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been 
taken from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner 
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also 
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his 
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served 
legitimate purpose and was not unduly oppressive.”); see also Austin, 509 U.S. at 617. 
89
 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
90
 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
91
 7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.17 (2019) (citing Mixed Local of 
Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union Local No. 458 v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. Int’l All., 212 Minn. 587, 
597, 4 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. 1942)) (“Notice and hearing are indispensable requirements 
of due process, but there is no requirement that the same be afforded at any particular stage 
of the proceedings.”). 
92 See, e.g., Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: 
JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594, 603 (Minn. 2019); Gams v. Houghton, 884 
N.W.2d 611, 619 (Minn. 2016) (employing Mathews to assess the process related to the 
involuntary dismissal of a personal injury action); Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785–
86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews to review the extension of an order for protection for 
potential violations of procedural due process); State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 568 
(Minn. 2007) (evaluating procedural due process rights concerning judicial review of a 
driver’s license revocation with Mathews); Martin v. Itasca County, 448 N.W.2d 368, 370 
(Minn. 1989) (utilizing Mathews to examine an employer’s leave of absence policy for a 
procedural due process violation); Machacek v. Voss, 361 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. 1985) 
(analyzing a statute requiring the temporary payment of child support based upon blood test 
results in paternity proceedings with Mathews). 
93 Machacek, 361 N.W.2d at 863. 
94 Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1983). 
95 State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1978). 
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On the other hand, Minnesota recognizes that the Barker factors apply 
to delays in access to courts, specifically to the delay in instituting a post-
seizure forfeiture action violating the due process clause.96 Barker, however, 
has not been applied to delays in the forfeiture context. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court had not encountered this particular issue until Olson. The 
only cases to date to incorporate Barker involved the right to a speedy trial.97 
Rather than stray from its precedent of broadly applying Mathews, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court continued to utilize this test, including in the 
quasi-criminal context of forfeiture.98 
III. THE OLSON DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History 
 On August 16, 2015, a Shakopee police officer observed Megan 
Olson driving under the influence of alcohol.99 After conducting a breath 
test that confirmed Megan was intoxicated, the officer arrested her for 
driving while impaired.100 This was not Megan’s first encounter with DWIs. 
In fact, at the time of her arrest, she had already been convicted of three 
previous DWIs within the last decade.101 Because of her prior DWI 
incidents in the last ten years, Megan was charged with two counts of felony 
first-degree DWI.102  
 Under the Minnesota vehicle forfeiture statute,103 a vehicle is subject 
to forfeiture when used to commit a “designated offense.”104 First-degree 
DWI offenses fall within the category of a designated offense.105 As a result, 
the 1999 Lexus that Megan was driving was seized, despite the fact that she 
was not the vehicle’s owner.106 Megan was the only driver of the Lexus,107 but 
her mother, Helen Olson, was the sole registered owner.108 Minnesota law 
96
 7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.23 (2019). 
97
 See, e.g., State v. Gayles, 327 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1982); State v. Terry, 295 N.W.2d 95 
(Minn. 1980). 
98
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 
N.W.2d 594, 603 (Minn. 2019). 
99
 Id. at 598. 
100
 Id. at 610. 
101
 Id. at 598. 
102
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN, 910 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
103
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63 (2018). 
104
 Id. § 169A.63, subdiv. 6(a). 
105
 Id. § 169A.63, subdiv. 1(e)(1). 
106
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 598. 
107
 Id. at 609. 
108
 Id. at 598. 
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provides that a vehicle may be seized incident to the lawful arrest of an 
individual suspected of committing a designated offense,109 but an interested 
party may file a demand for judicial determination to contest the seizure.110 
Even though Helen was not driving her vehicle, it was seized nonetheless 
because it was used to facilitate the commission of a designated offense.111 
As a result, both Megan and Helen were served notice of the seizure and 
intent to forfeit.112 
Once an individual makes a demand for a judicial determination, 
subdivision 9(d) requires a hearing to be “held at the earliest practicable 
date, and in any event no later than 180 days following the filing of the 
demand by the claimant.”113 However, this 180-day rule is subject to 
subdivision 9(d), which states that “[i]f a related criminal proceeding is 
pending, the hearing shall not be held until the conclusion of the criminal 
proceedings.”114 Additionally, it specifies that the hearing must be scheduled 
“as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the criminal prosecution.”115 
The statute does not provide further guidance on the length of time that is 
considered to be “as soon as practicable.”116  
Given that an owner is deprived of personal property, the statute 
provides three methods of reducing the hardship of deprivation.117 First, an 
owner may post a bond for the value of the vehicle and have it returned with 
a temporary disabling device.118 Second, a person with an interest in the 
forfeited property can file a petition for remission or mitigation of the 
forfeiture with the county prosecutor, who determines whether the 
forfeiture may reasonably be remitted or mitigated.119 Finally, the statute 
provides an innocent-owner defense.120 This defense allows owners who do 
not have actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful use of their 
property to petition the court, although family members are presumed to 
have this knowledge.121 
109
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdivs. 2(b), 6(a) (2018). 
110
 Id. subdivs. 8(e)–(f). 
111
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 610. 
112
 Id. at 598. 
113








 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599. 
118
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 4 (2018). 
119
 Id. subdiv. 5(a). 
120
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On October 7, 2015, Megan and Helen Olson filed a joint demand 
for judicial determination of the forfeiture, claiming that the statute violated 
their constitutional due process rights.122 A hearing was then scheduled for 
February 11, 2016.123 However, as required by the forfeiture statute,124 the 
hearing was continued six times due to Megan’s pending criminal 
proceedings.125  
Megan pleaded guilty to the first-degree DWI charge on October 12, 
2016, approximately fourteen months from the date of her arrest.126 Two 
days later, Megan and Helen moved for summary judgment and argued that 
subdivision 9(d) failed to provide a prompt forfeiture hearing.127 On 
February 23, 2017, approximately eighteen months after the seizure, the 
forfeiture hearing took place.128 The district court granted summary 
judgment to the Olsons, holding that their procedural due process rights 
were violated by the statute.129  
The State appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals found that the 
forfeiture statute was constitutional on its face because the Olsons failed to 
demonstrate that the statute would always be unconstitutional.130 The court 
reasoned that it is possible for a related criminal matter to be promptly 
resolved, which would allow for a prompt forfeiture hearing.131 However, 
due to the statute’s caveat preventing a hearing until after Megan’s criminal 
proceedings concluded, the court determined that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to both Megan and Helen.132 It reasoned that the 
statute failed to provide a mechanism for prompt, meaningful review.133 
  
                                                           
122
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599–600. 
123
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN, 910 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
124
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d) (2018). 
125
 Olson, 910 N.W.2d at 74. 
126












 Id. at 80. 
133
 Id.  
16
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/7
746 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the facial constitutionality 
of subdivision 9(d).134 It also upheld the unconstitutionality of the statute as 
applied to Helen Olson, who claimed to be an innocent owner.135 The court, 
however, reversed the Minnesota Court of Appeal’s determination that the 
forfeiture statute was unconstitutional as applied to Megan Olson, a 
non-owner driver.136 To reach this conclusion, the court’s first task was to 
determine the appropriate framework for reviewing the procedural due 
process claims presented.137 The majority considered the factors established 
in Barker, which involved the constitutionality of a delay leading up to a 
criminal defendant’s trial.138 However, the majority chose to apply the 
framework developed in Mathews, a case pertaining to the process afforded 
to individuals in the termination of government benefits.139  
 First, the Olsons claimed that the forfeiture statute was facially 
unconstitutional.140 They argued that the delay caused by the requirement to 
resolve criminal proceedings prior to a post-seizure hearing meant that no 
demand for judicial determination could ever be constitutionally prompt.141 
Much like the court of appeals, the majority concluded that there could be 
instances when the criminal proceedings are resolved quickly, which would 
lead to a constitutionally prompt post-seizure hearing.142 The majority 
reasoned that if the court can identify even “a single situation in which the 
[statute at issue] might be applied constitutionally, [a party’s] facial challenge 
fails.”143 Thus, the statute was not unconstitutional on its face.144 
 Next, Megan’s as-applied due process challenge was reviewed.145 In 
applying the Mathews factors, the court found that Megan’s private interest 
was limited.146 Since she was not the registered owner of the vehicle, she did 
not have an economic interest in selling or using the car as collateral.147 Also, 
                                                           
134










 Id. at 602–04. 
140




 Id. at 608. 
143






 Id. at 609 (describing Megan’s sole interest as the potential that she “could ask family or 
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Megan could not legally drive because her license had already been 
cancelled.148 Besides, the State had a compelling interest in curbing the risk 
to public safety by keeping repeat DWI offenders off the road.149 
Additionally, requiring a hearing to be held within a very short window after 
a seizure would significantly increase the administrative and fiscal burden 
on the court system, given the substantial number of DWI-related vehicle 
seizures each year.150 
Further, the risk of erroneous deprivation was not significant.151 Under 
section 169A.63, the vehicle could only be seized if Megan had committed 
a designated offense.152 The arresting officer had probable cause because the 
breath test showed she was intoxicated, and she had a record with three 
prior criminal offenses.153 These factors established that the classification of 
a designated offense was proper.154 Given that Megan had a timely 
preliminary judicial hearing regarding probable cause, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation was not compelling.155 The majority, therefore, ruled that the 
forfeiture statute was constitutional as applied to Megan, the sole driver of 
the vehicle.156 
 Finally, the court addressed whether the forfeiture statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to Helen.157 The majority determined that 
Helen’s private interest was greater than Megan’s interest.158 Although 
Helen’s driving license was also cancelled, the court found that the vehicle 
was still a financial asset to her.159 Additionally, the State’s interest was less 
significant.160 The State’s compelling interest in preventing DWI offenders 
from getting behind the wheel was weaker since Helen was not driving while 
impaired.161 Moreover, the administrative and financial burdens would be 
reduced if the requirement for a hearing shortly after seizure only applied 
                                                           
148
 Id.  
149




 See id. at 609–10 (indicating that this risk is minimal because of the evidence 
demonstrating probable cause to arrest Megan for driving while intoxicated and the fact that 
she had three previous DWIs in ten years). 
152
 Id. at 609. 
153






 Id. at 611–12. 
157
 Id. at 612. 
158
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to innocent owners.162 Lastly, and most critically, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation was significant.163 Helen purported to be an innocent owner, and 
the forfeiture statute did not provide potential innocent owners a probable-
cause hearing nor the ability to expedite the process.164 Therefore, the 
eighteen-month delay for a post-seizure hearing was a violation of due 
process, rendering the statute unconstitutional as applied to Helen.165 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court Should Have Applied Barker in Olson 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court overlooked the value of the Barker 
factors when deciding the Olson case. This section begins by introducing 
the United States Supreme Court’s incorporation of Barker into the context 
of civil forfeiture.166 Next, the quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture is 
explored to show that it has a closer relationship to the criminal context in 
Barker than the administrative context in Mathews.167 A subsequent deeper 
dive into the United States Supreme Court case reflects a mirror image of 
Olson.168 Finally, this section explains how applying Barker can avoid the 
inference of judicial interference that can arise from applying Mathews.169  
1. The Integration of Barker in Civil Forfeiture 
The Barker factors were initially established in a Sixth Amendment 
due process case to address the timeliness of a delay leading up to a criminal 
defendant’s trial.170 Willie Barker was to be tried for murder following trial 
of Silas Manning, the other suspected killer of an elderly couple.171 It was 
unlikely that Barker would be convicted without the testimony of Manning 




 Id. at 613. 
164
 Id. at 613–14. 
165
 Id. at 616. 
166
 See infra Section IV.A.1. 
167
 See infra Section II.A.2. 
168
 See infra Section II.A.3. 
169
 See infra Section II.A.4. 
170
 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515–16 (1972).  
171
 Id. at 516. 
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against him.172 Barker’s trial was delayed by sixteen continuances, resulting 
in over five years between his arrest and trial.173  
Eventually, Barker was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.174 He 
filed a habeas corpus petition that ultimately landed in the United States 
Supreme Court.175 There, the Court developed a test to assess the timeliness 
of process required in the criminal trial.176 The test analyzed (1) the length 
of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his 
right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.177 Although the Court found that 
“the length of delay between arrest and trial—well over five years—was 
extraordinary,” it concluded that the remaining factors outweighed this time 
frame.178 Barker had not objected to the continuances until Manning was 
convicted, nor did he want a speedy trial because he assumed he would not 
be tried if Manning was acquitted.179 Additionally, the Court found minimal 
prejudice.180 Therefore, the delay did not constitute a violation of his rights.181 
The Barker factors have since been extended to procedural due 
process claims in the forfeiture context.182 In United States v. Eight 
Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency,183 the 
United States Supreme Court applied the Barker factors to assess 
post-seizure delays in forfeiture. There, the Court analyzed whether the 
delay between the seizure of $8,850 and the Government’s filing of a civil 
forfeiture proceeding resulted in a due process violation.184 The decision to 
extend the Barker factors to a Fifth Amendment due process case involving 
property forfeiture derived from careful consideration of the similarities 
                                                           
172
 Id. (“The Commonwealth had a stronger case against Manning, and it believed that Barker 
could not be convicted unless Manning testified against him. Manning was naturally unwilling 
to incriminate himself. . . . By first convicting Manning, the Commonwealth would remove 
possible problems of self-incrimination and would be able to assure his testimony against 
Barker.”). 
173
 Id. at 516–18. 
174




 Id. at 530. 
177
 Id.  
178
 Id. at 533–34. 
179
 Id. at 534–35. 
180
 Id. at 534. 
181
 Id. at 536. 
182
 See, e.g., United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); United States v. Eight 
Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 
(1983); People v. One 1998 GMC, 960 N.E.2d 1071, 1087–88 (Ill. 2011). 
183
 461 U.S. 555, 565–69 (1983). 
184
 Id. at 556.  
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between the cases.185 Additionally, the Court acknowledged that its previous 
cases had only involved the issue of whether a pre-seizure hearing was 
required.186  
Prior to $8,850, the Court had not faced the narrow inquiry concerning 
the length of time of a post-seizure delay and due process violations.187 
Justice O’Connor explained that “[u]nlike the situation where due process 
requires a prior hearing, there is no obvious bright line dictating when a 
post-seizure hearing must occur.”188 Interestingly, the Court never 
mentioned the possibility of applying Mathews. By utilizing Barker, which 
was ultimately designed to assess timeliness in the forfeiture context, $8,850 
set new precedent.189  
Furthermore, the Court identified a significant discrepancy in the time 
permitted for Government investigations before a post-deprivation hearing 
in civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings.190 The majority concluded that 
“[a] suspect who has not been indicted retains his liberty; a claimant whose 
property has been seized, however, has been entirely deprived of the use of 
the property.”191 The Court recognized that the situation of a criminal 
defendant’s right to a speedy trial after an indictment, where he has been 
completely deprived of liberty, was analogous to forfeiture.192 Thus, in 
$8,850, Barker was the appropriate tool for analyzing the timeliness of post-
seizure forfeiture proceedings.193 
                                                           
185
 Id. at 564 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment claim here—which challenges only the length of time 
between the seizure and the initiation of the forfeiture trial—mirrors the concern of undue 
delay encompassed in the right to a speedy trial.”). 
186
 Id. at 562–63; see also, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
187
 $8,850, 461 U.S. at 562–63 (“Because our prior cases in this area have wrestled with 
whether due process requires a pre-seizure hearing, we have not previously determined when 
a post-seizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has 
been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.”). 
188
 Id. at 562. 
189
 Compare $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564 (holding that Barker factors should be applied in the 
forfeiture context when assessing the length of time before a post-seizure hearing), with 
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (invoking Mathews 
in a forfeiture case to determine whether a hearing was required under due process prior to 
the government seizing real property, which is distinguished from both issues regarding 
timeliness and post-seizure hearings). 
190
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2. Civil Forfeiture—Cross-Over into the Criminal Context 
Olson, a civil forfeiture case, should have adopted the Barker factors, 
instead of adhering to Mathews, because its circumstances are more aligned 
with the criminal context than with the administrative-benefits forfeiture in 
Mathews. It is likely that if the Minnesota Supreme Court had relied on the 
Barker factors, it would have found that section 169A.63 of the Minnesota 
Statutes did not violate Megan and Helen Olson’s due process rights. 
Instead, the court relied on Mathews.194 
While the Mathews framework has been used in a variety of 
procedural due process challenges,195 the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that it is not a universal test for all procedural due 
process claims.196 Mathews was originally developed to determine the 
adequacy of administrative procedures.197 It simply provided courts with a 
tool for analyzing fairness.198 The Court, however, has quickly adopted it as 
a decision-making test for cases in and out of the administrative context.199  
This widespread application has not gone uncontested. In fact, the use 
of Mathews has been criticized for its overreach—even into the realm of 
terrorism cases.200 A major source of controversy appears in the criminal law 
                                                           
194
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 
N.W.2d 594, 604 (Minn. 2019). 
195
 See generally Tom Pryor, Note, Turner v. Rogers, The Right to Counsel, and the 
Deficiencies of Mathews v. Eldridge, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1854, 1861 (2013) (noting the vast 
range of “procedural due process rules, precedents, and frameworks” that have evolved in 
the United States Supreme Court over the last several decades and the impact of expanding 
due process protections). 
196
 See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed 
Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.”); United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 66 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing  Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)) (“The Court has expressly rejected the 
notion that the Mathews balancing test constitutes a ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for deciding 
every due process claim that comes before the Court.”). 
197
 Pryor, supra note 195, at 1862. 
198
 Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering 
the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21 
(2005), (arguing that the Mathews framework was established for the particular set of facts in 
the case that could generate and facilitate a discussion of fairness rather than serve as a 
determinative test). 
199
 Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716–17 (2003)). 
200
 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the court’s invocation of “this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ from Mathews v. Eldridge . . . a 
case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits” was inappropriate). “Whatever the 
merits of [the Mathews] technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue (and 
even there they are questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common 
law already supply an answer.” Id. 
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context. Mathews hit a roadblock in Medina v. California,201 where the Court 
rejected the framework in addressing due process violations in criminal 
procedure.202 The Court reasoned:  
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of 
criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional 
guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process 
Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative 
judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes 
between liberty and order.203 
Accordingly, the Court deemed a narrower test to be more suitable for 
decision-making in the criminal arena.204   
A closer look at the spectrum of procedural due process protections 
raises a new question about the applicability of Mathews at the intersection 
of criminal and civil procedure. In this spectrum, the greatest protections 
are afforded in criminal proceedings205 and the least to administrative 
proceedings.206 The safeguards given in civil proceedings fall between 
criminal and administrative proceedings.207 This is logical as the stakes are 
much higher for a criminal defendant who may face the ultimate deprivation 
of liberty through incarceration or capital punishment.208 Civil forfeiture, 
particularly, has been deemed quasi-criminal in nature.209 While the goal of 
                                                           
201
 505 U.S. 437 (1992). 
202
 Id. at 443 (“[T]he Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework 
for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are part of the criminal process.”). 
Additionally, the Court had applied Mathews in two criminal cases prior to announcing the 
inadequacies of it in the criminal realm. However, it reasoned “it is not at all clear that 
Mathews was essential to the results reached in those cases.” Id. at 444 (citing United States 
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)). 
203
 Id. at 443. 
204
 Id.; see also 1 CRIM. PROC. § 2.7b (4th ed. 2018) (indicating that Medina deemed the 
utilitarian balancing of Mathews to be “inconsistent with the ‘narrower inquiry’ traditionally 
applied in determining what was ‘fundamentally unfair’ in a criminal case”). 
205
 Ramanujan Nadadur, Note, Beyond “Crimigration” and the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy—
Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the Immigration Context, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. 
J. 141, 146–47 (2013) (listing some of the constitutional rights afforded to criminal 
defendants, including the right to jury trial and the right to counsel). 
206
 Id. at 159–60 (describing the minimum requirements in administrative proceedings as the 
right to notice and the opportunity to be heard in writing). 
207
 Id. at 154–60 (enumerating the differences in procedural rights provided under each type 
of proceeding). 
208
 See id. at 155. 
209 United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Civil forfeiture 
statutes, although not sufficiently criminal to trigger the full array of constitutional protections, 
are nonetheless considered ‘quasi-criminal’ and implicate certain constitutional rights.”); see 
also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993) (citing Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. 347 
23
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civil forfeiture is remedial, the Court has acknowledged that there is also an 
underlying punitive objective.210  
Forfeiture is unique because the proceedings inevitably subject a 
property owner to being tied to criminal activity, regardless of the level of 
the owner’s involvement.211 A property owner in need of defending his or 
her crime may face a catch-22 scenario—either surrender the right against 
self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding or forfeit the use of evidence 
in the civil proceeding.212 Criminal law, where an individual’s liberty interest 
may be infringed upon in order to protect societal interests, functions 
comparably to forfeiture, where removing the instrument of crime through 
the deprivation of a property interest serves societal interests.213 Moreover, 
a criminal defendant is not necessarily afforded the same level of pretrial-
hearing rights prior to a government action depriving him of liberty as a civil 
litigant has prior to property deprivation.214  
Nonetheless, similar to the criminal context, where an individual’s 
liberty interest is infringed upon by detention or incarceration, civil 
forfeiture involves seizing a property interest.215 As Justice Frankfurter stated, 
“[The] right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of 
any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a 
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.”216 Despite this 
understanding that a hearing is required prior to the final deprivation of 
                                                           
(1808)); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921)) (“[T]his Court 
. . . consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.”). 
210 Austin, 509 U.S. at 617 (“If forfeiture had been understood not to punish the owner, there 
would have been no reason to reserve the case of a truly innocent owner [in the more recent 
cases]. Indeed, it is only on the assumption that forfeiture serves in part to punish that the 
Court’s past reservation of that question makes sense.”); see also Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. 
Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (“Modern civil forfeiture statutes are plainly designed, at least in part, to 
punish the owner of property used for criminal purposes.”). 
211 See Cheh, supra note 65, at 38 (emphasizing the criminal implications of civil forfeiture 




 See id. at 6. 
214 Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14 
(2006) (“[D]ue process hearing rights that are routine in the pretrial stages of civil cases can 
be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the comparable or greater 
interests at stake.”). 
215
 See Stone, supra note 70, at 434–37 (discussing the controversy surrounding the due 
process protections under civil forfeiture and its classification as civil rather than criminal, 
despite the fact that property has already been deprived at that point).  
216
 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 169 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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property,217 certain circumstances in civil forfeiture permit deprivation 
without a hearing.218 Civil forfeiture, in instances where the deprivation has 
occurred without a hearing, is more aligned with the criminal context 
because the due process protections are afforded post-deprivation. 
The realities of the criminal nature of forfeiture demonstrate that civil 
forfeiture cases should be given similar safeguards afforded to criminal 
cases. To facilitate these protections, courts assessing civil forfeiture should 
look to Medina to avoid the broad, sweeping framework of Mathews and, 
instead, employ narrower tests to provide the greatest protections in civil 
forfeiture contexts. Given that the Olson court dealt with a due process issue 
in the quasi-criminal context of forfeiture, it should have implemented the 
narrower inquiry from Barker rather than the overly expansive Mathews 
test. 
3. The Use of Barker in $8,850 Mirrors Its Applicability in Olson 
The Olson majority dismissed Barker as the overall mechanism for 
resolving the issue at hand.219 What is more, the court gave minimal, if any, 
consideration to the glaring factual similarities between Olson and $8,850, 
where the United States Supreme Court, as noted above, chose to apply 
Barker in the context of forfeiture.220  
In $8,850, Mary Vasquez declared that she did not have more than 
$5,000 in currency221 while being processed through customs at the airport.222 
Customs officials seized $8,850 from her and sent a letter indicating that it 
was subject to forfeiture.223 In her answer to the complaint seeking forfeiture, 
                                                           
217
 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (citing McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)). 
218 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (quoting Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)) (“We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule 
requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing, but only ‘in extraordinary circumstances where 
some valid government interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the 
event.’”).  
219
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 
N.W.2d 594, 603 n.5 (Minn. 2019). Nevertheless, the court applied “insights from Barker 
and $8,850 where appropriate.” Id. 
220
 See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983).  
221
 Id. at 557. At the time, Section 231 of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 1101, 
required individuals knowingly transporting currency in excess of $5,000 to declare the 
amount with the United States Customs Service. 
222
 Id. at 558. 
223
 Id.  
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Vasquez asserted an affirmative defense that the eighteen-month delay in 
commencing her civil forfeiture action violated due process.224  
The issue in $8,850 was whether the eighteen-month delay of a post-
seizure forfeiture hearing constituted a due process violation.225 In applying 
Barker, the Court first acknowledged that eighteen months was a significant 
delay.226 Second, the Court determined that the reasons for the delay were 
justifiable due to the Government’s “diligent pursuit” of processing 
Vasquez’s petition for remission and pending criminal proceedings.227 
Third, Vasquez’s failure to seek the available remedies to assert her right to 
a judicial hearing was assessed.228 Finally, review of prejudice revealed that 
Vasquez failed to demonstrate that the delay negatively impacted her 
defense against the forfeiture.229 Thus, the Court held that the 
eighteen-month delay leading up to a post-seizure forfeiture hearing did not 
violate due process rights.230 
The issue in Olson was identical—whether an eighteen-month delay in 
post-seizure forfeiture proceedings offended due process.231 Another 
similarity with $8,850 was the  underlying reason for the delay—the 
restriction of proceeding to the post-seizure hearing until pending criminal 
matters had concluded.232 This limitation in both cases is important because 
of the significant weight it carried in the quasi-criminal forfeiture context and 
the challenges that emerged from the intertwining of civil forfeiture and 
criminal proceedings.  
First, initiating a civil proceeding contemporaneously may 
compromise the criminal proceeding because forfeiture is frequently part 
of the sentence.233 Without the delay, the right against self-incrimination 
through the civil proceedings may be implicated.234 Additionally, prior civil 
proceedings may inadvertently grant claimants access to details of the 
pending criminal matters that claimants would not otherwise be privy to 
under the stricter rules of criminal procedure.235 Finally, a criminal 
                                                           
224
 Id. at 560–61. 
225
 Id. at 556. 
226
 Id. at 565. 
227
 Id. at 568. 
228
 Id. at 568–69. 
229
 Id. at 569. 
230
 Id. at 570. 
231
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 
N.W.2d 594, 602 (Minn. 2019). 
232
 Compare $8,850, 461 U.S. at 567, with Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599. 
233
 $8,850, 461 U.S. at 567. 
234
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 611. 
235
 $8,850, 461 U.S. at 567. 
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defendant may be able to assert that his or her defense in the criminal case 
was prejudiced by contemporaneous civil proceedings.236  
It is crucial that criminal defendants are not prejudiced by 
commencing a civil forfeiture proceeding.237 Even if a statute allows for a 
defendant to request an expedited civil proceeding, the government has a 
compelling interest in ensuring that the criminal proceedings take 
precedence. These concerns are specifically addressed by the second 
Barker factor—the reason for the delay.  
Moreover, the claimants in $8,850 and Olson failed to pursue the 
available remedies. In $8,850, Vasquez did not request the numerous 
remedies available to initiate an expedited forfeiture hearing, such as 
seeking the return of her seized property by filing an equitable action, filing 
a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), or requesting 
the matter to be referred to the United States Attorney.238 Similarly, in 
Olson, Helen did not pursue any action through the remission or mitigation 
provisions provided in the statute, post bond, or inquire about expediting 
the hearing.239  
 With each of these similarities, it is surprising that the Olson court 
did not choose Barker. Through $8,850, the United States Supreme Court 
made a deliberate decision to extend Barker to civil forfeiture cases. 
Mathews had already made a prominent mark in due process analysis, yet 
it was never referenced in $8,850. Given that Barker was applied in $8,850, 
the majority in Olson should have followed suit to evaluate this specific issue 
involving how quickly a hearing must be provided post-seizure.240 While the 
court in Olson explained that the Barker factors and Mathews framework 
overlap,241 it conceded that some aspects of prejudice to the individual facing 
                                                           
236
 United States v. One 1976 Mercedes, 667 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1982) (noting that a pending 
criminal case would take precedence over commencing forfeiture proceedings due to the 
risk of a defendant’s assertion of prejudice in defending the criminal case). 
237 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: 
JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-1083) (“Criminal 
defendants have constitutional rights that civil litigants do not. If a civil proceeding is not 
stayed, criminal defendants may lose those protections in the criminal prosecution. . . . So 
to protect criminal defendants from having to choose between defending their liberty in 
criminal court and protecting their property in civil court, the DWI forfeiture statute stays 
the civil proceeding and requires the criminal case to go first.”). 
238
 $8,850, 461 U.S. at 569. 
239
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600. 
240
 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General at 3, Olson v. One 1999 Lexus 
MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 
2019) (No. A17-1083) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General]. 
241
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 603 n.5. 
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a delay are not sufficiently addressed by Mathews.242 Considering the factors 
above, the majority could have reached a different conclusion in Olson, 
given that Mathews does not fully encompass all of the considerations in 
Barker.243 Therefore, the court should have employed the Barker factors to 
properly evaluate this specific procedural due process question of 
timeliness. 
4. Barker Provides an Opportunity to Avoid Criticism of Mathews 
 Barker asserts factors that are more objective in nature, which helps 
to avoid the appearance of judicial interference. By choosing Mathews, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court disregarded the framework’s primary criticism.244 
Similar to the vague language of the Due Process Clause, the Mathews 
framework leaves the balance of competing private and governmental 
interests open to interpretation.245 Consequently, judges are compelled to 
weigh factors that are impossible to truly measure.246  
In Olson, the majority compared the private interests of both Helen 
and Megan to conclude that one was stronger than the other, but the 
majority was unable to articulate the extent of the difference or how this 
would actually be quantified when balancing the other Mathews factors.247 
                                                           
242
 Id. (“[T]he ability of a person deprived of property to hold the government to account 
without the loss of evidence or faded memories that can sometimes accompany a long delay 
is an important private interest that is not fully captured in the traditional Mathews inquiry 
into ‘private interests.’”). 
243
 See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
244 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 982 (1987) (commenting on 
the arbitrary nature of balancing tests of individual versus government interests that have 
injected subjectivity and manipulation into constitutional interpretation); Lawson et al., supra 
note 198, at 21 (arguing that the Mathews framework was established for the particular set of 
facts at hand that could generate and facilitate a discussion of fairness, but it was not intended 
to serve as a determinative test). 
245 See Aleinikoff, supra note 244. 
246
 Pryor, supra note 195, at 1885; see also Rubin, supra note 36, at 1138 (articulating the 
complications in attempting to balance private and government interests that have virtually 
unavoidable contradictions between them) (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a useful 
approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as 
those in Mathews are concerned.”); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?—A 
Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 748–49 (1963) (“As soon as he 
finishes measuring the unmeasurable, the judge’s next job is to compare the incomparable. 
Even if he has succeeded in stating the interests quantitatively (or thinks he has), they are still 
interests of different kinds and therefore they can no more be compared quantitatively than 
sheep can be subtracted from goats.”). 
247
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 612 (“[A]lthough Helen’s private interest is not as strong as it would 
be if her license had been valid at the time of the seizure, her interest in the vehicle as both 
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The framework’s lack of guidance and excessive flexibility enables decision-
makers to mold the factors to fit the desired outcome.248 For instance, the 
court in Olson could have come to the opposite conclusion and affirmed 
the court of appeals’ decision that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional 
as applied to Megan, by emphasizing her private interest in the vehicle. After 
all, she was the exclusive driver of the vehicle and was solely responsible for 
its repairs.249  
This loose rein on judicial interpretation through Mathews may 
inadvertently lead judges to adjudicate based upon individual policy 
preferences.250 This may be especially problematic in the civil forfeiture 
realm, where there is a rising concern of injustice. For instance, Justice 
Thomas authored a statement in 2017 involving a petition for writ of 
certiorari of a civil forfeiture action, which seemed to serve in part as a call 
for reform due to the growing number of forfeitures and their increasing 
abuse.251 There, he questioned whether historical practice could continue to 
justify the constitutionality of civil forfeiture.252 
Minnesota, in particular, has focused on the issue of civil forfeiture 
abuse. In fact, new legislation has been introduced to place a complete ban 
on all administrative forfeitures.253 In 2017, Minnesota had 3596 DWI-
related forfeitures,254 accounting for forty-six percent of reported 
forfeitures.255 This number reflects an increase of over 450 forfeitures from 
2016.256 Moreover, in 2017, the net proceeds from forfeited property and 
                                                           
a financial asset and as property having social-use value makes her private interest stronger 
than Megan’s interest.”). 
248
 Nadadur, supra note 205, at 152–53 (identifying the common criticisms of Mathews, 
including the rejection of the framework in criminal procedure and its vulnerability to 
“outcome-oriented analysis”). 
249
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 609 n.10. 
250
 See Pryor, supra note 195, at 1876 (discussing the dangers of judges advocating for policy 
preferences through balancing the Mathews factors, “where they are neither constitutionally 
entitled nor institutionally capable”).  
251
 Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (“[B]ecause the law enforcement entity 
responsible for seizing the property often keeps it, these entities have strong incentives to 
pursue forfeiture. . . . This system—where police can seize property with limited judicial 
oversight and retain it for their own use—has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses.”).  
252
 Id. 
253 H.R. 1971, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019). 
254
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 609 (citing REBECCA OTTO, CRIMINAL FORFEITURES IN 
MINNESOTA FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2017, at 12–14 (2018),  
https://www.auditor.state.mn.us/reports/gid/2017/forfeiture/forfeiture_17_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CT3W-9DQF]).   
255 OTTO, supra note 254, at 12. 
256
 Id. at 13. 
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seized cash totaled over $7 million,257 with seventy percent kept by the 
seizing law enforcement agency, twenty percent by the prosecuting agency, 
and ten percent by Minnesota’s General Fund.258  
The Olson majority noted that when a pecuniary interest is directly 
linked to the outcome of a decision, there is a call for closer judicial 
scrutiny.259 Given that civil forfeiture has been vehemently debated, the use 
of Mathews may have led the court to bend, even unintentionally, towards 
individual policy preferences supporting civil forfeiture reform.260 By 
incorporating the less subjective Barker factors into its analysis, the court 
could have been better equipped to defend against those perceptions. The 
court, however, will likely continue to follow its new precedent of applying 
Mathews to civil forfeiture cases involving timing, which will open the door 
for perceptions of judicial activism. 
B. Despite Barker, the Minnesota Supreme Court Chose Mathews 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously applied Mathews in 
Olson. This section demonstrates the court’s error by highlighting the 
differences between the issues in Goldberg and Mathews with the issues in 
Barker and Olson.261 Additionally, this section argues that the court’s 
reliance on broad precedent in procedural due process matters caused the 
court to lose sight of the differences between private property and 
administrative benefits.262   
1. The Mathews Test Is Inapposite Because the Issues in Goldberg 
and Mathews Are Not Aligned with the Issues in Barker and 
Olson 
Despite the fundamental differences between the issues in Mathews 
and Olson, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied Mathews instead of 
Barker to determine whether subdivision 9(d) of the forfeiture statute was 
                                                           
257
 Id. at 9.  
258
 Id. at 5. 
259
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 610 n.12 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 
510 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1993)).  
260
 22 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, FORFEITURES § 1.01 (2019) (“Forfeitures are regarded with 
increasing disfavor.”). The call for reform was highlighted in a brief, arguing that “[t]he Court 
should take the opportunity to rein in civil forfeiture.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for 
Justice at 18–20, Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: 
JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-1083). 
261
 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
262
 See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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constitutional as applied to Megan and Helen Olson.263 Mathews, emanating 
from Goldberg v. Kelly,264 focused on a general due process inquiry.265 The 
intent in developing the Mathews framework was to ensure the government 
followed a fair process in administrative proceedings266 and to prevent the 
risk of wrongful deprivation of benefits.267 The particular issues were 
whether an evidentiary hearing was required pre-termination and what 
process was due.268 These issues are distinguished from the question posed 
in Olson in two significant ways.  
First, the Olson court grappled with the narrow issue of timing, as 
related to a hearing in the forfeiture context.269 In contrast, the preliminary 
question in Mathews was whether due process required a hearing to take 
place at all.270 Unlike Mathews, the statute in question in Olson provided for 
a hearing, albeit prior to the forfeiture adjudication.271 Neither of the Olsons 
even argued for a pre-seizure hearing.272 Thus, the Court acknowledged that 
the central issue in Olson was specific to the timing between the seizure of 
the vehicle and the first hearing, and whether this delay constituted a due 
process violation.273 The Barker factors take the aspects of timing directly 
into consideration by specifically targeting the length and reason for the 
delay.274 Therefore, cases like Olson that concern the timing of post-
deprivation civil forfeiture hearings fall outside of the scope of Mathews. 
Second, Goldberg and Mathews involved pre-termination hearings.275 
This addressed concerns of fair process prior to the deprivation of property. 
The issue in Olson concerned post-seizure proceedings,276 which implicate 
due process after depriving the individual of property. Olson is analogous 
                                                           
263
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 603.  
264
 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
265
 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
266
 See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1137 (referencing the underlying principle in forming the 
Mathews framework). 
267
 See id. at 1160–62 (comparing the due process protections afforded to government 
benefits but noting that “[t]he distinction between those benefits that are legitimately 
discretionary and those that must be constrained by procedural protections and predefined 
rules has not been established by the case law”); see also infra Section IV.B.2. 
268
 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. 
269
 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 
N.W.2d 594, 602 (Minn. 2019). 
270
 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. 
271
 MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9 (2018). 
272




 Id. at 603. 
275
 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970). 
276
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600. 
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to the proceedings in Barker that occurred after the loss of liberty.277 This 
critical difference signifies the limits of Mathews’ reach. After seizure, the 
timing of a hearing becomes paramount.278 The urgency of prompt pre-
deprivation hearings is arguably less than that for post-deprivation hearings 
because before deprivation, the individual maintains control of the interest 
at stake up until adjudication.279  
It may be argued that Mathews’ individual-interest prong is adequate 
to assess the level of need for promptness. After all, that was a defining 
distinction between the results of Goldberg and Mathews. The decision in 
Goldberg was significantly controlled by the substantial burden placed on 
an individual from losing his or her welfare benefits.280 The Court stated:  
By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or 
assets. . . . Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the 
face of . . . ‘brutal need’ without a prior hearing of some sort is 
unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it. . . 
. The crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid 
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive 
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he 
waits.281  
In contrast, the Court, in Mathews, held that disability benefits did not 
necessitate this same requirement because eligibility there did not hinge on 
financial need.282 Additionally, the fundamental reason for terminating 
disability benefits was that “the worker [was] no longer disabled or ha[d] 
returned to work,”283 which reduced the hardship of the loss. Thus, 
Mathews’ individual-interest factor considered the nature of the burden to 
determine the urgency of a prompt hearing. 
The Olson court noted that Mathews adequately addressed the 
question of urgency of a prompt post-seizure hearing.284 Nevertheless, 
Barker is a more appropriate test because it involved an even greater need 
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 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 564 (1972). 
278
 See Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 611 (quoting Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979)) 
(“Furthermore, the Court has held that after property has been seized without a hearing, ‘the 
[property owner’s] interest in a speedy resolution of the controversy becomes paramount.’”); 
see also Kuckes, supra note 214, at 12 (“In the limited circumstances when the government 
may take action before a hearing, the process required must be provided as soon as possible 
thereafter.”). 
279 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602. 
280
 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970). 
281
 Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
282
 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).  
283
 Id. at 336. 
284
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602–03. 
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for urgency—the deprivation of liberty by incarceration.285 Barker involved a 
habeas corpus petition, where the stakes of delaying adjudication are 
highest.286 Depriving liberty arguably has a much stronger need for an urgent 
and prompt hearing than the deprivation of a government entitlement.  
The hardship faced in civil forfeiture resembles the burden posed in 
Barker. In $8,850, the Court weighed the burden of forfeiting a substantial 
amount of money for eighteen months.287 Similarly, the Olsons faced 
adversity in losing a vehicle for eighteen months.288 The seizure stripped 
them of a mode of transportation, as well as their economic interest in 
selling or using the vehicle as collateral for a loan.289 Thus, since the Olson 
court determined that the urgency of a prompt hearing was a critical 
question, the Barker factors would have been better suited to address the 
delay.  
2. The Court’s Decision to Use the Broad-sweeping Mathews Test 
Resulted in Disregarding the Differences Between Private 
Property and Administrative Benefits 
The Olson majority rationalized its decision to invoke the Mathews 
framework by following precedent.290 The Minnesota Supreme Court had 
set the practice of employing the Mathews test in procedural due process 
claims.291 However, each of the cases cited by the majority covered a wide 
range of due process challenges, none of which pertained to civil 
forfeiture.292  
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 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972). 
286
 Id. at 518. 
287
 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983). 
288
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600. 
289
 Id. at 612. 
290
 Id. at 604. 
291
 Id.  
292 See, e.g., Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 619 (Minn. 2016) (personal injury action); 
Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785–86 (Minn. 2014) (order for protection); Sawh v. 
City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012) (designating a dog to be potentially 
dangerous was not a property interest); State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2007) 
(driver license revocation); Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 415–16 
(Minn. 2007) (driver’s license revocation); Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 
720, 723–24 (Minn. 1999) (driver’s license revocation); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 
N.W.2d 901, 908–09 (Minn. 1996) (teaching license revocation); Martin v. Itasca City, 448 
N.W.2d 368, 370 (Minn. 1989) (leave of absence policy); Violette v. Midwest Printing Co.–
Webb Publ’g, 415 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1987) (workers’ compensation benefits); In re 
Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1986) (civil commitment statute); Machacek v. Voss, 
361 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. 1985) (child support payments); Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 
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In particular, the Minnesota Supreme Court strongly emphasized its 
holding in Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Public Safety293 to justify its 
application of Mathews.294 The issue in Fedziuk was whether due process, 
in the context of a license revocation under an implied consent law, was 
violated.295 There, the statute in question failed to specify any time period 
for judicial review, which caused a violation of due process.296 The Olson 
dissent noted that the nature of the due process challenge in Fedziuk was 
different because it did not involve property forfeiture.297 While Mathews—
decided in the administrative context—is more relevant in license 
revocation,298 it is less applicable in the setting of civil forfeiture.299  
The Olson court’s unrelenting reliance on Mathews ignored the 
distinction between the deprivation of private property interests and the 
deprivation of administrative benefits. These differences can be illustrated 
by returning to the concept of protections on a spectrum.300 Forfeiture of 
private property raises the stakes with its quasi-criminal nature.301 Forfeiture 
demands notice and a hearing—both due process requirements.302 Other 
constitutional requirements, such as the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines, also 
apply in the context of civil forfeiture.303 Thus, private property interests 
receive greater protections from deprivation. 
                                                           
N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1983) (driver’s license revocation); State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1978) (parole release). 
293
 Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d 340, 348 (Minn. 2005) (holding that the absence of language to 
require a prompt hearing for review of driver’s license revocations within the Minnesota 
Implied Consent Law provisions violated procedural due process). 
294
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 604. 
295




 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 616 n.1 (Gildea, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
298 See id. at 604 (noting that the Mathews test has been appropriately applied in the context 
of implied consent license revocation). 
299
 See id. at 616 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the 
Barker test is more appropriate in the context of civil forfeiture than the Mathews test). 
300
 See discussion supra Section IV.A.2. 
301
 See supra text accompanying notes 205–18.  
302
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 607. 
303 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIM. LAW & PROC. § 36:68 
(4th ed. 2018); see also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule applied in forfeiture, and unlawfully-seized evidence from 
a vehicle could not be used in a civil forfeiture proceeding). The United States Supreme 
Court has subsequently limited the reach of the exclusionary rule by incorporating a 
balancing test weighing deterrent effects with societal costs, but it remains an applicable rule 
in civil forfeiture proceedings. See Joshua Lewellyn, Note, Losing Your Navigator: Why the 
Exclusionary Rule Should Not Apply to Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceedings, 13 LIBERTY U. 
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Lower on the spectrum lies public benefits. These benefits are 
statutorily created and can be broken down into the categories of 
discretionary or non-discretionary.304 Non-discretionary benefits—such as 
welfare benefits—must be afforded the minimum, constitutionally-required 
procedures, including notice and the opportunity to be heard.305 
Discretionary benefits, however, belong at the very end of the continuum 
with the least amount of protection. They can be eliminated even without 
the minimum procedures.306  
On this scale, the government action in Fedziuk—revoking a license307 
lies closer to Mathews’ termination of disability benefits than the deprivation 
of private property through civil forfeiture in Olson. Therefore, in the 
absence of a forfeiture case, the justification in using Mathews, only to rely 
on precedent, is flawed. 
C. Predictions of the Results in Olson under the Barker Factors 
 The outcome in Olson likely would have been different in some 
respects, and the same in others, if the Barker factors had been 
implemented. The Barker framework, like the Mathews framework, would 
likely have resulted in the finding of constitutionality of section 169A.63 of 
the Minnesota Statutes as applied to Megan Olson.308 The outcome for 
Helen Olson, however, could have been different under Barker because 
the statute would likely be constitutional as applied to her.309 Additionally, 
this section postulates the scenario for a typical innocent owner under 
Barker and demonstrates that the Barker factors may be more favorable for 
these individuals.310 
                                                           
L. REV. 153, 153–54 (2018); see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) 
(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)) 
(“[Forfeiture] constitutes ‘payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,’ and, as 
such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.”) 
304 See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1160–62 (comparing the due process protections afforded to 
government benefits but noting that “[t]he distinction between those benefits that are 
legitimately discretionary and those that must be constrained by procedural protections and 
predefined rules has not been established by the case law”). 
305
 See id. (reciting “social welfare benefits or public education” as examples of 
nondiscretionary benefits that are provided based on eligibility). 
306
 See id. (“When the benefit is awarded to a small number of ‘best’ candidates, it is 
legitimately discretionary. A research grant, a government construction contract, or the 
placement of a child for adoption would be obvious examples.”). 
307
 Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. 2005). 
308
 See infra Section IV.C.1. 
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 See infra Section IV.C.2. 
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 See infra Section IV.C.3. 
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1. The Finding of Constitutionality as Applied to Megan Olson 
Had Barker been used, the Minnesota Supreme Court would likely 
have reached the same conclusion with respect to Megan Olson—that the 
statute was constitutional as applied to her. Under the first Barker factor—
the length of the delay—eighteen months would still likely be considered 
substantial.311  
Second, the underlying reason delaying the forfeiture proceeding—the 
second Barker factor—was to protect Megan Olson as a criminal 
defendant.312 Given that the vehicle in question was used to facilitate the 
commission of her alleged crime, instituting a forfeiture proceeding before 
the criminal trial could undermine her criminal case. Thus, the second 
Barker factor would support a finding of as-applied constitutionality for 
Megan. 
Third, Megan demonstrated a lack of effort in asserting her rights, 
which frustrates the third Barker factor.313 The hearing was continued six 
times due to her pending criminal matter.314 Even so, Megan never 
demanded a speedy hearing.315 In fact, she agreed to several continuances.316 
This is analogous to Barker, where the lack of objections to a series of 
continuances showed that the defendant did not desire a speedy trial.317 
Moreover, she did not pursue recovery of the vehicle through the statute’s 
remission or mitigation provisions, nor did she post bond for the vehicle.318  
Finally, the minimal prejudice posed to Megan from the delay would 
probably be insufficient to render section 169A.63 of the Minnesota 
Statutes unconstitutional under the fourth Barker factor—prejudice to 
defendant. At the time of her arrest, Megan was driving without a valid 
                                                           
311
 See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983) (finding an eighteen-month delay to be substantial).  
312 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924  
N.W.2d 594, 611 (Minn. 2019) (“One reason the State proffers for this delay is the need to 
protect the criminally charged individual from incriminating herself in a civil proceeding.”).  
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 Id. at 600. 
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 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 910 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
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 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 237, at 7. 
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 Olson, 910 N.W.2d at 76 (“[T]he district court noted that there was no dispute of material 
fact that the ‘matter was continued several times at the agreement of all involved as they 
awaited the conclusion of the underlying criminal action.’”). 
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 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534–36 (1972); see also Jovanovic, supra note 59, at 4 
(“[Regarding the third Barker factor], the claimant’s assertion of the right to a judicial hearing, 
the court held that if the clamant fails to file an equitable action seeking an order compelling 
the filing of the forfeiture action or return of the seized property, or fails to take other action 
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 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600. 
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license.319 It had been cancelled for her conduct that was “inimical to public 
safety.”320 Therefore, the prejudice would be limited because she lacked the 
ability to legally drive. What is more, Megan was not the owner of the car, 
which meant that her transportation and economic interests in the vehicle 
were limited.321 Thus, the delay caused minimal prejudice. Since the 
majority of the Barker factors indicate that the delay in the post-seizure 
hearing was not unreasonable, the court would probably still have reversed 
the court of appeals’ holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to Megan. 
2. The Finding of Constitutionality as Applied to Helen Olson 
Had the Minnesota Supreme Court utilized the Barker factors instead 
of the Mathews framework, Helen Olson might have received a negative 
outcome. Even though she purported to be an innocent owner, her 
particular situation may have led the court to find that the delay was not 
unreasonable.322  
In considering the first Barker factor—the length of the delay—the court 
would likely continue to acknowledge that a delay of eighteen months was 
substantial.323 Although the length of the delay would undermine the 
constitutionality of the statute, the remaining Barker factors would likely 
outweigh the length of the delay and ultimately lead to a finding of 
constitutionality. 
The second Barker factor—the reason for the delay—is debatable. On 
the one hand, Helen was limited by the statute’s requirement to conclude 
pending criminal matters before proceeding with a forfeiture hearing.324 On 
the other hand, the delay was also caused by Helen’s lack of action in 
asserting her rights, as discussed under the third factor below. As Chief 
Justice Gildea’s dissent stated, “[T]he delay here is largely the result of 
choices that Helen made.”325 Thus, it is unclear whether the second Barker 
factor would aid or thwart Helen’s interests. 
The third and fourth Barker factors, concerning the assertion of rights 
and prejudice to the claimant, would likely tip the scale in favor of the 
statute’s constitutionality as applied to Helen. Helen did not assert her rights 
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 See id. at 616–18 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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 See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983) (finding an eighteen-month delay to be substantial). 
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 Id. at 600. 
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 Id. at 617 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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by requesting an expedited hearing as an allegedly-innocent owner would, 
under section 169A.63, subdivision 7(d), of the Minnesota Statutes.326 In 
fact, Chief Justice Gildea noted that Helen “essentially took no action in the 
forfeiture proceeding” until a year after filing the demand, when she filed 
the motion for summary judgment.327 Even if she had pushed for her 
innocent-owner defense, it likely would not have succeeded unless she 
could clearly demonstrate that she had no knowledge of or tried to prevent 
Megan’s unlawful activity.328 This would likely be a difficult hurdle to 
overcome due to Megan and Helen’s familial relationship.329 Additionally, 
Helen did not assert her right under section 169A.63, subdivision 5(a), to 
petition for a return of the vehicle, nor did she post a bond.330 Moreover, 
she did not object to any of the six continuances that delayed a speedy 
hearing.331 Each of these failures to seek available remedies undermines 
Helen’s argument for unconstitutionality under the third Barker factor—the 
defendant’s assertion of her right.  
Finally, the fourth Barker factor—prejudice to defendant—would likely 
frustrate Helen’s case. Her license had already been suspended at the time 
of the seizure, and she would not be able to legally drive the vehicle, 
regardless of the delay.332 The court may have found a delay to be more 
reasonable for a claimant who is unable to use the vehicle in the first place. 
While Helen would still have an economic interest in the vehicle, it would 
probably not be substantial enough to consider the delay prejudicial.333 The 
court also noted that Megan was the exclusive driver of the vehicle,334 which 
would further mitigate prejudice from the delay to Helen. Given this analysis 
under Barker, Helen’s particular circumstances would probably fail to 
demonstrate a due process violation. 






 See MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 7(d) (2018) (requiring, “by clear and convincing 
evidence,” that the Petitioner “did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle 
would be used or operated in” an unlawful manner, or that Petitioner “took reasonable steps 
to prevent the use of the vehicle by the offender”). 
329
 See id. (“If the offender is a family or household member of any of the owners who 
petition the court and has three or more prior impaired driving convictions, the petitioning 
owner is presumed to know of any vehicle use by the offender that is contrary to law.”). 
330
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600. 
331
 See Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 910 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
332
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 612. 
333
 Id. at 618 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he delay in getting 
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statute is unconstitutional.”). 
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 Id. at 609. 
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3. The Outcome for a Typical Innocent Owner 
Although Helen Olson’s innocent-owner defense may not have 
prevailed under Barker, these factors may provide a stronger claim for 
innocent owners in general, as elucidated by the Minnesota Attorney 
General’s amicus brief. First, the length of the delay would vary for other 
innocent owners because section 169A.63, subdivision 9(d), of the 
Minnesota Statutes does not set a time frame for a hearing after the pending, 
related criminal matters have been resolved.335 Because section 169A.63 
does not afford innocent owners a probable-cause hearing or a preliminary 
hearing for their innocent-owner affirmative defense, this first factor should 
carry more weight for an innocent owner when a pending criminal matter 
causes a lengthier delay in asserting the innocent-owner defense.336  
Second, the reason for the delay may also aid an innocent owner 
because the underlying reasons for a delay due to pending criminal matters 
do not protect the innocent owner in the same way that they protect a 
criminal defendant.337 As the innocent owner is not a party to the criminal 
matter, she or he has no involvement in or control over the speed of the 
proceedings.338 Thus, citing pending criminal matters as justification for the 
delay may not be reasonable for an innocent owner.339 This will weigh in the 
innocent owner’s favor. 
Third, the outcome of the third Barker factor—the assertion of rights 
by the innocent owner—will vary based on the facts of the case. Depending 
on the action taken, this factor may help or hinder the balance of factors in 
an innocent owner’s case. Section 169A.63, subdivisions 4 and 5(a), of the 
Minnesota Statutes provide two pathways for an individual to assert her 
rights.340  
One option is to post a bond.341 In that case, the vehicle is returned 
with a disabling device rendering it temporarily undrivable.342 Since an 
innocent owner cannot use the vehicle under these circumstances, the 
decision not to seek this option would probably be insignificant. The second 
option is to file a petition for remission or mitigation with the county 
prosecutor.343 In determining whether to grant remission or mitigation, the 
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prosecutor weighs the government’s need for possessing the vehicle against 
the particular innocent owner’s individual circumstances.344 As the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals noted, a court will likely have difficulty in 
assessing the sufficiency of the hardship relief that is offered if the owners 
never pursue the available remedies.345 Therefore, failure to assert this right 
for available relief may weigh against the innocent owner in the balance of 
these factors and weaken the possibility of establishing undue delay.346  
Finally, the fourth Barker factor—prejudice caused by the delay—is 
enhanced for an innocent owner. For innocent owners, the prehearing delay 
is the “direct cause of a deprivation [of their mode of transportation] that 
can limit [their] ability to earn a living and otherwise participate in modern 
social life.”347 In contrast, the delay for a DWI defendant who drives and 
owns a vehicle would not be the cause of the inability to drive because the 
offender’s license is likely to have been suspended regardless.348   
All in all, Barker would likely have been more effective than Mathews 
in recognizing the urgency required for innocent-owner forfeiture hearings 
without clearing the path for claims from guilty owners charged with 
DWIs.349 Given that the forfeiture statute does not permit the seizure of a 
vehicle if the registered owner is innocent,350 an innocent owner with a valid 
license, who pursues the statute’s remedies, may overcome the obstacles 
that Helen could not under Barker.  
D. Implications for Future Decisions in Minnesota 
 The use of Mathews instead of Barker is likely to strengthen 
procedural due process claims for guilty owners with repeat DWI offenses 
and confine Barker to Sixth Amendment speedy trial cases. Olson, by 
applying Mathews, established a common private interest of ownership, 
shared by both innocent and guilty owners. Affording owners guilty of DWI 
offenses the same rights as innocent owners might, in the future, result in a 




 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 910 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (“[W]e cannot 
determine whether the Olsons could have obtained adequate hardship relief under Minn. 
Stat. § 169A.63 because they failed to seek such relief.”). 
346
 Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General, supra note 240, at 12. 
347




 See id. at 7–13 (assessing each of the factors and arguing that the success of a constitutional 
challenge regarding timeliness of post-seizure hearings for innocent owners may be greater 
than individuals facing DWI charges when the Barker factors are applied). For further 
discussion of Mathews’ impact on guilty owners charged with DWIs, see infra Section 
IV.D.1. 
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pathway for guilty owners to succeed in similar procedural due process 
claims.351 Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has now cast aside the 
United States Supreme Court’s use of Barker in the forfeiture context, 
which steers Minnesota towards a universal Mathews test for future 
procedural due process cases.352 
1. The Comparison of Innocent Owners to Guilty Owners Likely 
Risks an Influx of Timing-Related Procedural Due Process 
Cases 
Due to the application of Mathews in Olson, Minnesota courts may 
experience an influx of claims pursuing prompt post-seizure hearings. In 
applying Mathews to determine that section 169A.63, subdivision 9(d), of 
the Minnesota Statutes was unconstitutional as applied to Helen, the court 
stressed the risk of erroneous deprivation to innocent owners.353 The 
innocent-owner defense allows for the property’s recovery if the owner can 
“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioning owner 
did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used 
or operated in any manner contrary to law or that the petitioning owner took 
reasonable steps to prevent use of the vehicle by the offender.”354 
However, by upholding the use of Mathews in Olson, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has essentially devised a new avenue for DWI offenders in 
forfeiture cases to challenge the statute. While Helen purported to be an 
innocent, non-driving owner, there may be similar instances in the future 
where guilty drivers who own a seized vehicle assert this same due process 
claim.355 A crucial difference between Megan’s and Helen’s interests was that 
Helen was the owner and Megan was not.356 That said, the interests of private 
owners—even guilty owners—are much more aligned with innocent 
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 See infra Section IV.D.1. 
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 See infra Section IV.D.2. 
353 Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924  
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forfeiture-law-found-unconstitutional?back_page=137 [https://perma.cc/3C7Y-TN5K] 
(observing that an individual who owns a vehicle and is arrested while driving has private 
interests that are much more aligned with innocent owners than non-owners, which may have 
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owners.357 All owners alike have an interest in transportation.358 Additionally, 
all owners have an economic interest in selling, loaning, or using a vehicle 
as collateral.359  
Consequently, the court may encounter a rise in challenges concerning 
the length of delay between vehicle seizure and post-seizure forfeiture 
hearings from DWI offenders who also own the vehicle. Olson has set the 
precedent of applying Mathews to forfeiture cases going forward. By 
establishing Helen’s strong individual interest as a purported innocent 
owner,360 Olson has made it more difficult for the state to overcome the same 
high-level private interest afforded to repeat DWI driver-owners. This may 
frustrate the State’s efforts in keeping repeat DWI offenders off the road.361  
Applying Barker would have avoided this issue of supporting the 
private interests of guilty owners. Unlike Mathews, Barker does not 
expressly rely on balancing private interests.362 Thus, applying Barker does 
not bring to light the private interests that guilty owners can now argue are 
impaired. Without directly incorporating the assessment of private interests 
into the factors, Barker effectively prevents the shared interests of innocent 
and guilty owners from being recognized as a key element in analyzing due 
process violations. 
2. Disregarding Barker in Olson Limits Barker’s Use Going Forward 
 Since Olson marked the first time the Minnesota Supreme Court 
encountered the specific issue of delay in a forfeiture hearing, its decision 
to employ Mathews over Barker sets the precedent for subsequent cases. 
                                                           
357
 See Ramsay, supra note 355. 
358
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 604 (quoting Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 256, 260–61 (8th Cir. 
1994)) (“Automobiles occupy a central place in the lives of most Americans, providing access 
to jobs, schools, and recreation as well as to the daily necessities of life.”). 
359
 Id. at 605 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54–55 
(1993)). 
360
 Id. at 612. 
361
 Id. at 609 (quoting State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 570 (Minn. 2007)) (“[D]runken 
drivers pose a severe threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota[,] . . . [and] 
[t]he state has a compelling interest in highway safety that justifies its efforts to keep impaired 
drivers off the road, particularly those drivers who have shown a repeated willingness to drive 
while impaired.”). In Minnesota, the forfeiture of property associated with designated 
offenses is intended to “enhanc[e] public safety by separating repeat intoxicated drivers from 
the instrumentality used to commit criminal actions.” 22 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, 
FORFEITURES, § 1.02(e) (2019). 
362
 Compare Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (identifying the four Barker factors, 
none of which explicitly pertain to private interests), with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976) (specifying private interests as the first component to be considered under the 
Mathews framework). 
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This represents one more type of procedural due process matter to be 
tossed in the bottomless Mathews bucket. Given that in Olson, the broad 
Mathews test was chosen to address a narrow due process question, 
Minnesota may be migrating towards a single, all-encompassing test for due 
process cases.  
This practice has been repeatedly denounced by the United States 
Supreme Court because of the direct contradiction between a universal test 
and the flexible nature of the procedural due process doctrine.363 Perhaps 
Justice Frankfurter said it best when he stated, “Expressing as it does in its 
ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment 
which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional 
history and civilization, ‘due process’ cannot be imprisoned within the 
treacherous limits of any formula.”364  
The Minnesota Supreme Court has now foreclosed the possibility of 
using Barker to analyze delays in forfeiture proceedings. By forfeiting the 
opportunity to use Barker in this instance, the court has likely constricted 
future uses of Barker solely to Sixth Amendment speedy trial cases. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court put an end to the use of Barker in forfeiture 
before it could begin. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the first time, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of the 
constitutionality of a post-seizure delay arising from a forfeiture statute. To 
make this determination, the court confronted the question of whether to 
assess the claims using the Mathews framework or the Barker factors.365 The 
Mathews framework was designed to assess the constitutionality of process 
in general, while the Barker factors were intended to evaluate the 
constitutionality of time delays in particular.366 Despite the majority’s 
acknowledgement that the principal issue was the permissible length of a 
procedural delay,367 the court selected Mathews.368 In part, this decision was 
based on the court’s inclination to follow precedent in procedural due 
process cases.369 Nonetheless, the court failed to properly consider the 
                                                           
363
 See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 
437, 443 (1992); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
364
 McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 162 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
365
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 601. 
366
 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 237, at 6. 
367
 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602. 
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narrow precedent set by the United States Supreme Court’s use of the 
Barker factors in assessing the timing of post-deprivation delays in the 
forfeiture context.370  
Applying Mathews may result in the unintended consequence of future 
DWI-offender owners increasingly asserting due process challenges 
associated with forfeiture. Using Barker, on the other hand, would have 
removed the balancing of private interests from the equation, effectively 
avoiding the link between innocent and guilty owners. The court missed the 
opportunity afforded by Barker to offer innocent owners an exclusive and 
strong claim against unjustified delays in forfeiture hearings. By doing so, 
the court has shut the door on using Barker in future forfeiture cases. 
Unfortunately, the court has simultaneously opened another door for repeat 
DWI offenders to assert their now-recognized, weighty private interest in a 
prompt post-seizure hearing. By providing repeat drunk drivers with a 
mechanism to return behind the wheel, this decision will likely have 
dangerous repercussions. 
                                                           
370
 See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
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